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The global space is a place where decision-making and regulation involve 
diverse actors who act outside of State control yet who affect the rights and 
obligations of individuals and groups. Its innate plurality speaks against the 
temptation to understand accountability as a predetermined concept. Instead, it is 
argued that accountability within the global context should be reconceptualised 
through the relationships of global decision-making bodies. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is a 
subsidiary organ of the UN. If an enquiry into what UNHCR is accountable for is 
undertaken through an examination of its relationship with the UN according to a 
type of accountability, rather than as a measurable outcome of externally imposed, 
uniform “accountability standards”, divergent and potentially conflicting 
accountability obligations will be revealed. As discussed in this paper, when the 
relationship between UNHCR and the UN is considered through legal 
accountability, it becomes evident that the position of UNHCR as a subsidiary 
organ allows the UN to retain a degree of control and supervision over UNHCR 
that corresponds with its functional autonomy, and that the terms of UNHCR’s 
Statue determines the scope of that control and supervision. When considered 
through organisational accountability, however, complex considerations involving 
hierarchy, “unspoken authority”, political influence and horizontal accountability 
become evident. 
An understanding of the layered nature of the relationships of UNHCR creates 
a clearer perception of the body’s accountability, and the relationship between the 
UN and UNHCR, which is also represented by a conceptual model, provides 
insight into the limits of what UNHCR can and cannot achieve as part of its 
mandate, and in its wider role as a humanitarian agency. It is only when the nature 
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of a global decision-making body’s accountability relationships are understood 
that the expectations, or accountability obligations, that flow from them will 
emerge. To identify what a global decision-making body is accountable for before 
identifying its relationships may create expectations of accountability that do not 
relate to the body’s operations or relationships, and will produce skewed results of 
its accountability performance, potentially impeding the development of effective 
and relevant accountability mechanisms. 
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Beyond the traditional boundaries of sovereignty and international law exists 
the global space. A forum for global or transnational administration,
2
 where 
decision-making and regulation involve diverse actors who largely act outside of 
State control, yet who affect the rights and obligations of individuals and groups, 
it is a context whose scope defies identifiable parameters. If there is a legal order, 
it is fragmented. If there is a constituency, it is a fractured one. The conditions for 
an accountability deficit are there, and if accountability solutions are to be 
effective the innate plurality of the global space must be acknowledged in a way 
that recognises that accountability cannot be defined through preconceptions of 
what that concept should entail. An examination of the inter-institutional 
relationships of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
demonstrates that when accountability is understood as a product of the 
relationships of a global decision-making body (“global body”), it becomes 
responsive to the unique challenges and obligations of that body, as well as to the 
way that external principles such as international law or human rights impact it. If 
what a global decision-making body is accountable for is identified before its 
relationships, there is a risk of the creation of expectations of accountability that 
may not relate to that body’s functions and purpose. It is the relationships of 
global bodies that produce its accountability obligations and an appreciation of 
those obligations, including how they intersect and conflict with each other, is 
crucial to the successful design and implementation of effective and responsive 
accountability mechanisms. 
UNHCR is a special programme and subsidiary organ of the United Nations 
(UN). If an enquiry into what UNHCR is accountable for is undertaken through 
an examination of its relationship with the UN according to a ‘type’ of 
accountability, rather than as a measurable outcome of externally imposed 
uniform “accountability standards”, then divergent and potentially conflicting 
accountability obligations will emerge, When the relationship between UNHCR 
and the UN is considered through legal accountability it becomes evident that the 
position of UNHCR as a subsidiary organ allows the UN to retain a degree of 
control and supervision over UNHCR that corresponds with its functional 
autonomy
3
 and that the terms of UNHCR’s Statue
4
 determines the scope of that 
control and supervision. Yet this is an incomplete picture of UNHCR’s 
accountability obligations. UNHCR’s relationship with the UN can also be 
considered through organisational accountability, which introduces complex 
considerations involving hierarchy, “unspoken authority”, political influence and 
horizontal accountability. An understanding of the layered nature of the 
relationships of UNHCR creates a clearer perception of the body’s accountability, 
and the relationship between the UN and UNHCR provides insight into the limits 
                                                 
2
  B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law” 68 (3-4) Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) p. 16. 
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of what UNHCR can and cannot achieve as part of its mandate, and in its wider 
role as a humanitarian agency. 
1. A Plural Approach to Accountability in the Global Space 
In the search for a solution to the accountability deficit in the global space, the 
diversity of that context should not be overlooked in favour of an approach that 
limits the ability of accountability to respond to plurality. When the requirements 
for accountability are standardised, or applied in a uniform way that fails to 
consider the unique characteristics of the context in which they operate, or are not 
divorced from the assumptions that inform them, the potential for creating 
effective accountability solutions is threatened. 
One way accountability is standardised is through the use of indicators. 
Indicators are used to compare a variety of social and socio-political phenomena 
such as corruption,
5
 the rule of law
6
 and human trafficking
7
 in relation to countries, 
institutions or corporations, and evaluate their performance by reference to one or 
more standards.
8
  When indicators are used to “measure” accountability they tend 
to cast adrift substantive issues in favour of the kind of procedural standards that 
are generally considered to be components of accountable governance, such as 
transparency and participation. For example, One World Trust is a London-based 
independent charity that produces research on accountability and global 
governance. Its Global Accountability Framework (GAF) develops an indicator 
framework that is designed to measure the accountability of intergovernmental 
organisations, transnational corporations and international non-governmental 
organisations.
9
 GAF “unpacks” accountability into what it calls “dimensions”, 
which are transparency, participation, self-evaluation and “complaint and 
response”.
10
 These dimensions are further separated into indicators,
11
 each of 
which has levels
12
 that are scored from 0 – 3 according to a scaled system.  
The difficulty with such procedural indicators is that when are separated from 
substantive content, they risk losing their relevance. Indicators that measure 
                                                 
5
  Transparency International, a global civil society organisation, produces an annual 
Corruption Perception Index. 
6
  In 2002, UNDP developed a Political Freedom Index, which included “rule of law” as an 
indicator. 
7
  Trafficking in Persons indicators have been produced by the US State Department. 
8
  K.E. Davis, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, “Indicators as a Technology of Global 
Governance” 46 Law and Society Review (2012) p. 71. 
9
  Pathways to Accountability II: The 2011 Revised Global Accountability Framework 
(2011) (‘2011 GAF Report’) One World Trust <http://oneworldtrust.org/publications/cat_view/64-
publications-by-project/69-principles-of-accountability> p. 18. 
10
  Ibid 55. 
11
  Accountability strategy, transparency, participation – external stakeholders, participation 
– internal member control/good governance, participation – shareholder control/good governance, 
evaluation (IGOs and INGOs), social and environmental evaluation (TNCs), complaints and 
response – external and complaints and response – internal. 2011 GAF Report, p. 31.  
12
  For example the indicator “Accountability Strategy” is broken into the following three 
levels: 1) Stakeholder mapping and prioritization; 2) Accountability mapping and action plan; 3) 
Commitment to and awareness of existing external accountability commitments. 
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substantive issues, such as the quality of business laws and institutions
13
 or social 
and economic development
14
 do so based upon collective knowledge, experience 
and expertise. The World Bank’s Doing Business indicators measure regulatory 
output in relation to dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, 
registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading 
across borders, enforcing contracts, closing a business and employing workers.
15
 
These indicators are understood to represent substantive elements that are 
common to all business regulation. Indicators that are used to measure 
accountability of governance consider procedural issues, which is relatively 
unproblematic in the domestic context because there is a somewhat cohesive 
understanding of governance that bonds procedural accountability to substantive 
governance elements. For example, the democratic legitimacy that underpins 
many of the world’s governance structures has influenced the development of 
procedural rights, such as natural justice or “procedural fairness”. However, in the 
global context, governance methodology is disparate, making it difficult to “pin” 
accountability indicators on concrete and measurable outcomes, which then 
encourages a tendency to frame accountability according to the commentator’s 
experiences of domestic socio-political and legal traditions.  
Commentators and decision makers from common law countries may find it 
difficult to divorce their notion of accountability from responsible government 
and the institutional checks and balances that uphold it.
16
 Commentators and 
decision makers from civil law countries will tend to understand the “adjudication 
of accountability” (i.e. administrative and judicial review) to require a high level 
of involvement by judges in evidence collection and policy making, and an 
inquisitorial participation in the decision-making process.
17
 Whilst experience of 
pre-existing domestic accountability mechanisms serve as an important tool in the 
institutional design of accountability mechanisms in the global space, a failure to 
identify underlying assumptions may result in an incongruence that will be 
counter-productive to designing and implementing effective solutions to the 
global accountability deficit. 
A second challenge posed by the use of procedural accountability indicators in 
the global space is that their purpose may be subverted in order to legitimise the 
actions of an organisation. One function of indicators is standard setting.
18
 
                                                 
13
  Such as the “Doing Business” indicators, which are utilised by the World Bank. See K.E. 
Davis, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, “Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance” 46 Law 
and Society Review (2012) pp.90-95. 
14
  See Davis, Kingsbury and Merry’s discussion of the Human Development Index. Ibid pp. 
95-99. 
15
  Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises 
World Bank 
<publications.worldbank.org/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=24391> visited 15 
October 2013. 
16
  See generally P. Finn, “Public Trust and Public Accountability” 3 Griffith Law Review 
(1994) pp. 224–244; J. Goldring, “Accountability of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and 
“Responsible Government” 11 Federal Law Review (1980) pp. 353-385.  
17
  See B. Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common Law World (The Law 
Book Exchange, New Jersey, 2006) pp. 132–135. 
18
  K.E. Davis, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, “Indicators as a Technology of Global 
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Externally imposed indicators act as a guide to “community values” and will 
serve as a useful tool with which to design an organisation’s standards. For 
example, transparency, which it can be argued is a fundamental expectation within 
a democratic community, may be transformed into a procedural standard that 
requires policy documents to be published on an Internet database within a certain 
amount of time. Although the prospect of community values shaping 
organisational behaviour in a practical way is undoubtedly positive, where 
indicators are used as a way to create standards that justify “actions to those 
whom they affect according to reasons they can accept”
19
 rather than reflect the 
actual accountability obligations that arise from an organisation’s relationships, 
the result may be reduced to an exercise of self-legitimisation. 
When accountability in the global space is examined in terms of legal 
accountability,
20
 an absence of a cohesive legal order becomes apparent. No one 
legal order can claim exclusivity of the global space and although it is not a 
lawless frontier by any means, the contribution of many and varied domestic legal 
systems, along with the presence of international law, leaves a global legal order 
that is fragmented, at best. It follows that without a unified legal ontology the 
concept of accountability is vulnerable to being populated by assumptions about 
its normative content. For example, calls for democracy at the global level have 
been accompanied by claims that a fundamental function of accountability is to 
achieve democratic aims. In her examination of the accountability of government 
networks, Anne-Marie Slaughter acknowledges that accountability is a complex 
concept that can mean different things in different contexts and according to 
“different political theories”.
21
 At the same time however, she claims that 
“determining how to hold these officials” (in relation to officials of networks of 
government agencies) democratically accountable becomes a paramount 
concern.’
22
 The influence of differing political theories is acknowledged, yet the 
connection between democracy and accountability is assumed. A presumption that 
democracy and accountability are inextricable may result in a failure to consider 
the challenge of how accountability might adapt to spaces (global or national) 
where there is no democracy, as we understand it in its traditional sense.
23
 
Human rights also provide discourse that is a strong normative basis for much 
of the commentary on global accountability
24
 and is increasingly presumed to 
                                                                                                                                     
Governance” 46 Law and Society Review (2012) p. 83. 
19
  M.D. Williams, “Citizenship as Agency within Communities of Shared Fate” in S. 
Bernstein and W.D. Coleman (eds.), Unsettled Legitimacy: Political Community, Power, and 
Authority in a Global Era (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2009) p. 43. 
20
  According to R.W. Grant and R.O. Keohane, legal accountability «refers to the 
requirement that agents abide by formal rules and be prepared to justify their actions in those 
terms, in courts or quasi-judicial arenas». See R.W. Grant and R.O. Keohane, “Accountability and 
Abuses of Power in World Politics” 99 American Political Science Review (2005) p. 17.  
21
  A-M. Slaughter, “The Accountability of Government Networks” Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 8 (2000-2001) p. 360. 
22
  Ibid 348 (emphasis added). 
23
  «Even in a bare monarchical legal order in which there is administrative law, one assumes 
that there is accountability to the law of the state». See D. Dyzenhaus, “The Concept of (Global) 
Administrative Law” Acta Juridica (2009) p. 6.  
24
  See e.g., M. Lion, “Human Rights Obligations and Accountability in the Face of Climate 
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underpin the policy design and implementation of International Organisations 
(IO) and the UN and its agencies. Measuring how accountable a body or agency is 
for the “protection of human rights”
25
 without a corresponding requirement to 
qualify who they are owed to and what they are owed for, risks human rights 
accountability becoming a noble but ultimately superficial goal. Human rights of 
individuals within the context of administrative decision-making are often 
understood as meaning procedural rights, such as transparency, participation and 
due process. However, procedural rights may be of limited relevance to a global 
body whose decisions do not affect individuals directly. Without adapting human 
rights accountability to a specific context and to a specific body, the 
implementation of human rights protection into policy and programme design will 
be of limited effect. 
Another assumption about accountability in the global space is that it is based 
on public values. However, hybrid public-private and wholly private organisations 
that are also global bodies are not totally receptive to the imposition of the public 
values that tend to inform accountability. In the former, both government 
representatives and private parties play a role in policy design and decision-
making. To impose expectations of accountability that are modelled upon public 
or “citizen” participation and transparency may fail to recognise the competing 
interests of the private participants in the organisation. Wholly private 
organisations have no governmental representatives and therefore no particular 
responsibility to include transparency and participation in its platform that stems 
from a sense of public or political accountability. Measuring or ranking such 
global bodies based upon transparency in the same way as an IO will say little 
about their platform, stakeholders and relationships and creates straw man 
standards in the guise of legitimate expectations of accountability. 
Whether through indicators that purport to measure the accountability of 
governance, or through assumptions about what accountability means, when 
accountability is applied to the global space in a way that fails to recognise the 
complexity and plurality of that context, the potential for effective solutions is 
compromised. Identification of a recipient of accountability within the global 
space is a more layered and complex process than within the domestic context. 
Citizen rights and relationships with government at the national level are 
commonly described according to political accountability because a clear 
relationship exists between the government and the “people”. In the global space, 
a fractured constituency may exist but a global demos does not, and as such, the 
identity of the recipients of accountability are not immediately clear. If there is a 
global constituency, it is made up of interlacing but competing “sub-
                                                                                                                                     
Change” 38 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (2010) p. 543; M. Pallis, 
“The Operation of UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms” 37 International Law and Politics 
(2005) pp. 869 and 874. 
25
  See e.g., J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis, P. Scmitt (eds) Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2010); J. M. Woods, “A Human 
Rights Framework for Corporate Accountability” 17 ISLA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (2011) pp. 321–334; A. Buchanan & R. O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global 
Governance Institutions” 20 Ethics & International Affairs p. 406. 
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constituencies”, which vie for influence in global governance.
 26
 Understanding 
accountability at the global level requires re-evaluation of the concept of political 
accountability to accommodate uncertainty about who it is that global bodies are 
accountable to. 
Accountability that is limited to pre-conceived standards is not designed to 
sufficiently respond to plurality, which is one of the defining characteristics of the 
global space. Whilst indicators in particular can demonstrate, in a public and 
practical way, how States and global organisations may be “held to account”, it is 
questionable whether the concept of global accountability is cohesive enough, or 
whether global bodies are sufficiently similar to render a standardised or assumed 
understanding of accountability effective within this context. 
 
2. Accountability through the Looking Glass: How UNHCR’s 
Institutional Relationships Shape its Accountability Obligations 
If accountability is to be “achieved” in the global space, it must be understood in 
terms of relationships. It is only when the nature of a global body’s relationships 
are understood that the expectations that flow from them will emerge. The nature 
of a global body’s relationships depends upon the unique nature, objectives and 
structure of that body. The expectations that flow from a body’s relationships are 
accountability obligations, which describe what a global body is accountable for, 
based upon its relationships. Accountability obligations are not autonomous; they 
intersect, compete with and undermine each other. Understanding the way that 
accountability obligations intersect reveals why a body is not accountable in some 
way. Understanding accountability as relationships reflects the fundamental 
diversity of the global space and is in contrast to a more traditional method that 
defines accountability according to external standards (discussed above) and is 
imposed according to whom the body believes itself to be accountable.
 27
 The 
consequence of a “relationship approach”  to accountability is that the impact of 
the type of accountability (e.g., legal and political accountability) is not 
considered until after a global body’s relationships have been identified.  
Applying this approach to explore UNHCR’s accountability involves 
identification of its relationships and asking what accountability obligations arise 
from that relationship, based upon a particular type of accountability. This paper 
focuses upon UNHCR’s inter-institutional relationship with the UN, and poses the 
question, “what accountability obligations arise when this relationship is 
considered through legal and organisational accountability”? The answer reveals 
that UNHCR’s accountability obligations compete with and undermine each 
                                                 
26
  N. Krisch, “The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law” 17(1) European Journal of 
International Law (2006) p. 247, p. 253. Krisch identifies three possible approaches to identifying 
constituencies in the global space; nationalist, internationalist and cosmopolitan. 
27
  According to Kingsbury, a public entity may be accountable to its public, «yet the 
decision may be taken by an entity whose public is not the public truly affected». See B. 
Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law”, Working Paper No 2009/1, 
Institute for International Law and Justice, NYU, (2009) p. 42. 
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other, and are more complex than a standardised or uniform understanding of 
accountability could hope to accommodate.  
 
2.1 UNHCR’s Relationship with the UN: Legal Accountability 
The relationship that exists between UNHCR and the UN can be described as 
vertical in the sense that it is shaped by UNHCR’s position as a subsidiary organ 
and is dictated by the express words of UNHCR’s Statute. However, the limited 
terms of UNHCR’s Statute, coupled with expectations of UNHCR’s independence, 
define that relationship in such a way as to limit the practical control that the UN, 
in the guise of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and ECOSOC, exercises over 
UNHCR. 
Whilst the relevant parts of the UN Charter and the general law that governs 
international institutions dictate the establishment and termination of subsidiary 
organs, the power of the subsidiary organ to make decisions is determined by the 
limits of its own mandate.
28
 For a subsidiary organ to be lawfully established, two 
pre-conditions must be met. First, it must be established by a principal organ
29
 and 
second, it must be under the authority and control of that principal organ.
30
 The 
parameters of authority and control are not defined by the UN Charter but have 
been variously described as the ability of the principal organ to change the terms 
of reference and composition of the subsidiary organ, issue policy directives, 
receive reports from the subsidiary organ, accept or reject their 
recommendations,
31
 overrule a decision by a subsidiary organ if that decision is 
contrary to applicable legal rules and the right to question the way in which the 
subsidiary organ has exercised its competence.
32
 Regardless of how the authority 
of the principal organ is defined, it does not extend to dictation of the way that the 
subsidiary organ carries out its functions or makes its decisions, the lawfulness of 
which is contingent on whether such actions are vires the subsidiary organ’s 
mandate. In practice, the degree of control and supervision a principal organ has 
over the subsidiary organ is determined not by elusive principles of authority but 
by the terms of its mandate and its functional autonomy.
33
 
The terms of UNHCR’s mandate that are relevant to the authority and control 
of the UN and thus, which create accountability obligations for UNHCR, are 
Paragraphs 3, 9 and 11 of its statute. Paragraph 3 of UNHCR’s Statute requires the 
High Commissioner “to follow policy directives given him by the General 
                                                 
28
  Ibid 86. 
29
  Charter of the United Nations, art 7(2) 
30
  A subsidiary organ has been defined by the UN as one that is established by or under the 
authority of a principal organ. General Assembly Official Records, 9th Session, Annexes, Agenda 
Item 67, at p. 13, A/C 1/758, paras. 1 and 2. Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, vol. 
1, p. 228. 
31
  General Assembly Official Records, 9th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 67, at p. 13, A/C 
1/758, paras. 1 and 2. ILA Report, 5. See also Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, vol. 
I, p. 228. 
32
  Ibid. 
33
  Ibid. 
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Assembly or the Economic and Social Council”.
34
 Paragraph 9 gives the UNGA 
authority to determine additional activities.
35
 Although the UNGA does not 
specify which of its resolutions deal with “policy” and which determine 
“additional activities”, they may be best differentiated by characterising the 
former as an elaboration of UNHCR’s activities related to its mandated 
responsibilities and the latter as the intention to add new responsibilities.
36
 In 
practice, Paragraph 3 and 9 translate to the annual adoption of “omnibus” 
resolutions, which clarify the UNGA’s concerns and priorities about displacement 
on a global basis and “situational” resolutions, which refer to specific countries.
37
 
Finally, Paragraph 11 requires UNHCR to report annually to the UNGA through 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
38
 
UNHCR’s relationship with ECOSOC, which is a body internal to the UN that 
was established to coordinate the work of its 14 specialised agencies,
39
 is not built 
upon the same level of authority/subordination as its relationship with UNGA. As 
mentioned above, Paragraph 11 of UNHCR’s statute declares that UNHCR is to 
report to the UNGA through ECOSOC. In practice, UNHCR now submits its 
annual reports to the UNGA directly,
40
 removing ECOSOC as a “buffer” between 
UNHCR and UNGA, and diminishing any authority that may have been inherent 
in this role. According to Paragraph 3 of the Statute, UNHCR still has a 
responsibility to follow policy advice provided by ECOSOC. In reality, ECOSOC 
resolutions do not tend to dictate policy that exclusively relates to refugees but 
instead, deals with matters that may affect refugees, such as violence against 
women
41
 and issues that relate to a particular region or country.
42
 
                                                 
34 
 UNHCR Statute, para 3: «The High Commissioner shall follow policy directives given 
him by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council.». 
35  UNHCR Statute, para 9: «The High Commissioner shall engage in such additional 
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To limit the parameters of the relationship between UNHCR and the UN as 
being restricted to the terms of UNHCR’s mandate, however, is to underestimate 
the importance of functional autonomy to that relationship. UNHCR’s position as 
a UN special programme means that it derives international legal personality that 
is compatible with its objectives and functions from the UN.
43
 An ability to act 
and speak autonomously is a constitutive element of legal personality
44
 and as a 
holder of international legal personality, regardless of its limitations, UNHCR 
exercises a separate will to the UN or member States by taking action that 
expresses its “corporate will”
45
 rather than the “aggregate opinion” of member 
states.
46
 This action, which has been labelled “UNHCR Doctrine”
 47
, describes 
UNHCR’s “voice” on refugee issues, or the articulation of its views on such 
issues. UNHCR doctrine represents UNHCR’s opinion on what refugee law is, 
what is should be and how it applies. Regardless of its form, which includes 
handbooks/manuals, policy and background papers, speeches, recommendations 
and commentaries, UNHCR doctrine, which has the common characteristic of 
being produced by the secretariat of the organisation, rather than by State 
representatives, is indicative of UNHCR’s functional autonomy. 
Functional autonomy need not be limited to autonomy as understood in relation 
to international legal personality. An organisation can also be considered 
functionally or “institutionally” autonomous based upon practice, functions and 
structure. UNHCR has been delegated a specific field of activity – international 
protection - over which it has complete responsibility. A specific field of activity 
is synonymous with “technical expertise”, which has been considered evidence of 
institutional autonomy.
48
 Further, it has bureaucratic independence
49
 in the form 
of a self-sufficient, decision-making secretariat, its membership is differently 
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These observations are not made to argue that UNHCR is a completely 
autonomous organisation. The fact that it is a subsidiary organ is enough to 
counter such a suggestion. However, UNHCR has developed significant features 
of autonomy in a way that ensures that the UN’s relationship with UNHCR is 
carried out according to what can be described as a “limited control model”. 
“Limited control” means that the UNGA or ECOSOC do not generally act beyond 
the terms of UNHCR’s Statute, leaving UNHCR with significant independence in 
decision-making, policy development and advice. The accountability obligations 
created by the relationship are limited to those specifically created by UNHCR’s 
statute (Paragraphs 3, 9, and 11) and more generally, to account for the way it 
carries out its competence. Despite reference to UNHCR being «under the 
authority of the General Assembly» in Paragraph 1 of the Statute, the UN is not 
intended to exercise unbridled power over UNHCR – at least not when considered 
through legal accountability. 
It has been observed that UNHCR, although «born with little autonomy and 
few prospects for expansion» has been «able to capitalize on world events and use 
its authority to greatly expand both the groups of people it assisted and the kinds 
of assistance it could give».
51
 This is perhaps, what ultimately drives the limited 
control model by the UN – recognition of the fundamental need for UNHCR to 
remain responsive to social and political change. 
 
2.2 UNHCR’s Relationship with the UN: organisational accountability  
Like any organisation, much of what UNHCR does is dictated not by rules and 
legal obligations, but by the way it is designed and how its practice manifests. 
When UNHCR is understood through an open systems perspective, which is an 
organisational theory that focuses upon an organisation in relation to its context,
52
 
a significant part of its practice becomes its interactions between internal and 
external stakeholders. These interactions, or institutional relationships, are driven 
by mutual accountability obligations that rely upon the structure, systems and 
processes
53
 of the organisation, rather than its legal framework. Drawing upon the 
objective of organisational theory to understand how organisations function and 
relate to their environment,
54
 accountability in this context is understood as 
organisational accountability. When placed within the parameters of 
organisational accountability, the relationship between UNHCR and the UN 
remains vertical, creating obligations for both UNHCR and the UN that are based 
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on UNHCR’s position within the UN system, and which can conflict with the 
limited legal accountability obligations inherent to the relationship. 
The hierarchical nature of the relationship between the UN and UNHCR 
reinforced by a number of services and programmes that specify and extend the 
kind of accountability obligations that are owed by UNHCR. The first of these 
services is the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which was 
established in 1994 and is the UN’s internal accountability mechanism. The OIOS 
operates as an independent office that assists the Secretary-General in the 
oversight of the UN through monitoring, internal audit, inspection, evaluation and 
investigation.
55
 In particular, it ensures agency compliance with resolutions, rules 
and policy and seeks to prevent «fraud, waste, abuse, malfeasance and 
mismanagement».
56
 The OIOS creates obligations for UNHCR by putting 
procedures in place that ensure that UNHCR, along with other bodies within the 
UN system, is accountable for the efficient and effective delivery of the 
“organisation’s activities”. Further, it ensures that it is answerable, and 
accountable, for misconduct. The OIOS has conducted two investigations into 
allegations of UNHCR misconduct. The first, undertaken in 2002, investigated 
allegations of sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers within refugee camps 
in West Africa.
57
 The second involved the establishment of a specialised task force 
to investigate allegations of corruption at the UNHCR office in Nairobi.
58
 
Although the OIOS was unable to verify the alleged incidents that precipitated the 
investigation into sexual exploitation, it found that sexual exploitation of refugees 
was “real”. The corruption allegations however, were verified, with the task force 
finding that refugees were being asked to pay money for positive status 
determination and a number of people, including UNHCR staff and Kenyan police 
officers, were arrested. The fact that it was UNHCR itself who requested that 
OIOS investigate the allegations in both cases does not detract from the fact that 
the OIOS ensures that UNHCR is accountable to the higher levels of the UN (i.e. 
the Secretary-General) for the actions of its staff and partners. The final paragraph 
of the report into the investigation of corruption in Nairobi contains comments 
made by UNHCR acknowledging as such. 
The situation that led to the need for this investigation is indeed regrettable, but 
UNHCR has been able to learn and implement many lessons from the 
investigation. As a result of the experience in Kenya, UNHCR will in the coming 
months become a much more accountable organization, management and 
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When UNHCR comments that it will become “a much more accountable 
organization” it is not just referring to accountability to refugees, it 
acknowledging its accountability within the UN system. 
Other relevant programmes or services are those that have been developed 
internally or in collaboration with partners to create accountability obligations that 
are specific to the UN’s functions and/or to particular position holders within the 
UN. First, the UN Security Management System (UNSMS), whose mission it is 
«to enable the conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the safety, 
security and well-being of personnel and the security of United Nations premises 
and assets»,
60
 creates a relationship between «Executive Heads of the United 
Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes and the Secretary-General» to ensure 
«that the goal of the UNSMS is met within their respective organizations».
61
 The 
UNSMS Policy Manual expressly states that Executive Heads are responsible and 
accountable to the Secretary-General and that in recognizing the coordinating role 
and authority of the Secretary-General in matters related to the safety and security 




Second, the 2005 Inter-Agency Standing Committee Humanitarian Reform 
Initiatives (IASC Initiatives) create a relationship between UNHCR and the UN 
where the accountability obligations are specific to a particular area of the UN’s 
functions (i.e. humanitarian aid) and the immediate recipients of accountability 
are high-level office holders within the UN (the Emergency Relief Coordinator 
and Humanitarian Coordinators). Under the IASC “cluster” model, a cluster lead 
(UNHCR) is directly accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator for: 
ensuring system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to 
humanitarian emergencies; ensuring greater predictability; and more effective 
inter-agency responses in their particular sectors or areas of activity.
63
 At a 
country level, UNHCR is accountable to the Humanitarian Coordinator for 
ensuring, to the extent possible, the establishment of adequate coordination 
mechanisms for the sector or area of activity concerned; adequate preparedness; 
and adequate strategic planning for an effective operational response.
64
 
Not all of UNHCR’s organisational accountability obligations are so easily 
identifiable, however. First, there is an “unspoken authority” implicit to 
hierarchical accountability that can manifest in the way that the removal of senior 
officials is dealt with. Whilst the appointment of senior officials within the UN 
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may be a transparent process that is carried out according to formal and accepted 
procedures, the removal of those officials from office can be far more opaque. The 
election and re-election of the High Commissioner for Refugees is made by the 
UNGA on the proposal of the UN Secretary-General and given formality and 
transparency in the form of a UNGA decision.
65
 However, in circumstances where 
a High Commissioner has vacated the office prior to the completion of his or her 
term, he or she has generally resigned.  
In 1989, the then High Commissioner for Refugees Jean-Pierre Hocke resigned 
because of an accusation that he had used Danish contributions to «a fund set up 
by Nordic countries for refugee education to pay for entertainment and first-class 
air travel, sometimes aboard the Concorde, for himself and his wife».
66
 A number 
of years later in 2005, a second scandal caused the resignation of another High 
Commissioner, Ruud Lubbers, who was accused of sexually harassing a female 
employee. Although both Commissioner’s resigned rather than being officially 
removed from office, the extent to which their decisions were free from political 
pressure, particularly from the UN Secretary-General, merits questioning. Despite 
Mr Hocke maintaining that he «did not feel to have been pressured» in making his 
decision,
67
 some newspapers at the time reported that the then UN Secretary-
General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, told Hocke that he could not remain at his post.
68
 
At the news conference announcing his resignation, Hocke read out a letter which 
said, amongst other things, that his resignation did «not reflect any sentiment of 
culpability on my part concerning any of my doings» and mentioned the 
«destructive intentions of some people here and elsewhere».
69
 Lubbers on the 
other hand, spoke directly about the pressure placed on him by Koffi Annan, the 
UN Secretary-General at the time, to resign. Although the day before the 
announcement of his resignation, Lubbers had said that Annan had not asked him 
to resign, in his resignation letter he said that Annan had given him two choices - 
resign or face suspension and charges of breaking UN rules. Maintaining his 
innocence, Lubbers said, «To be frank, and despite all my loyalty, insult has now 
been added to injury and therefore I resign as High Commissioner».
70
  
Resignation is a useful public relations tactic, a way to maximize damage 
control in difficult circumstances. Although presented as a freely made decision, it 
is likely that both Hocke and Lubbers were placed in positions where they were 
left with little choice but to resign. Lubbers’ veiled accusation and Hocke’s denial 
of culpability and counter-attack on persons unknown is testament to that. The UN 
Secretary-General is highly influential in the election of a candidate to the office 
of the High Commissioner and he or she is the ultimate authority in the removal, 
or resignation of the Commissioner from office. Whether transparent or 
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“unspoken”, the authority inherent in the ability of the Secretary-General to 
influence the resignation of a High Commissioner without the need for more 
formal “removal” procedures solidifies the relationship between the UN and 
UNHCR as traditionally hierarchical and one that is based upon a model of 
vertical accountability. 
A second example of “unspoken authority” is where the UN Secretary-General 
has made decisions to override action taken by High Commissioners, which 
arguably exhibits authority that conflicts with the limited control model inherent 
in the legal accountability obligations owed by UNHCR to the UN. The 
reprimand of Sadako Ogata, High Commissioner for Refugees, by Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General in February of 1993 was a clear indication 
that in certain circumstances, the Secretary-General will override a High 
Commissioner’s decision. It is arguable that such action has no basis in the terms 
of UNHCR’s Statute or in its legal position as a subsidiary organ of the UN.  
After High Commissioner Ogata had ordered the cessation of aid to some parts 
of Yugoslavia due to militants impeding its delivery, Boutros-Ghali publicly 
rebuked her and overturned her decision by ordering UNHCR to resume 
humanitarian assistance to the area.
71
 The UN Secretary-General is given no 
specific authority to make such an order outside of the authority the UNGA and 
ECOSOC are given to issue policy directives to the High Commissioner 
72
 or for 
the UNGA to determine additional activities.
73
 As mentioned above, the phrase 
«under the authority of the General Assembly» means that UNHCR acts at the 
direction of the UNGA and not the UN Secretary-General
74
 or any other principal 
organ of the UN such as the UN Security Council. If the authority to act in such a 
manner does not find support in the constitution of UNHCR, might it be justified 
by UNHCR’s position as a subsidiary organ of the UN? It is arguable that 
Boutros-Ghali’s actions also went beyond that expected of a principal organ. In its 
report on the accountability of IOs, the ILA considered that the power of a parent 
organisation extended to the overruling of a decision of a subsidiary organ if that 
decision was contrary to applicable legal rules.
75
 It is difficult to see how a 
decision made about humanitarian aid delivery could be so defined. The actions of 
the UN Secretary-General were extraordinary, not only because they exposed 
political conflicts over UN programme management
76
 but also because they were 
a clear indication that the authority of the UN (in the guise of the UN Secretary-
General) over subsidiary organs has the potential to extend beyond legal rules into 
“interference” with policy decisions made at the most senior levels. 
The layers of accountability created by institutional factors in the context of 
hierarchical relationships will generally have the effect of expanding the 
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accountability obligations owed by the subordinate to the principal. However, 
where that relationship is inter-institutional and the subordinate party is a 
subsidiary of the principal, accountability must be reciprocal. Reciprocal or 
“reverse” accountability means that, despite the centrality of supervision and 
control in the role of the principal, the principal also owes accountability 
obligations to the subsidiary. Under the heading “Supervision and Control” the 
ILA report makes the following relevant recommendations: 
 
1) IO-s remain fully accountable for the actions and omissions of subsidiary organs; 
2) Parent organs have a duty to exercise a degree of control and supervision over 
subsidiary organs which corresponds to the functional autonomy granted; […]  
5) An organ of an IO that has delegated the exercise of any of its powers or functions 





The ILA’s position that an IO is «fully accountable for the actions and 
omissions of subsidiary organs» and for the way in which its delegated powers or 
functions are exercised places important controls on the potential for the kind of 
arbitrary exercise of authority that may occur within hierarchical relationships. 
The ILA’s view of inter-organisational accountability reflects a strong compulsion 
against tyrannical, unbridled authority within IO governance and has the effect of 
reversing the vertical flow of accountability within the UN/UNHCR relationship 
by turning UNHCR into a recipient of accountability. 
UNHCR’s place in the UN system informs a more far-reaching concept of 
accountability than its legal status as a subsidiary body implies. When the 
hierarchical aspect of the relationship between a subsidiary and principal organ 
manifests within a practical institutional context, accountability not only 
subsumes existing organisational accountability mechanisms, it receives the 
“unspoken” elements of authority that are inherent in hierarchical relationships. 
The institutional design of UNHCR expands the relationship between UNHCR 
and the UN by providing for accountability obligations that are additional to those 
created by UNHCR’s Statute. Whilst most of these obligations increase the 
accountability owed by UNHCR, some create an accountability obligation for the 
UN in respect of the actions of UNHCR. 
 
The complexities and intersections of UNHCR’s relationship with the UN are 
represented in the following conceptual model, which maps the accountability 
elements of the relationship between UNHCR and the UN. 
 
Figure 1. UNHCR and the UN: Accountability Obligations 
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The model identifies ten accountability obligations (represented by circles) that 
are created by the relationship between UNHCR and the UN.  
Three of these obligations, “report annually to UNGA”, “undertake additional 
activities determined by UNGA” and “follow UNGA/ECOSOC policy directives” 
are characterised through legal accountability (represented by dashed arrows). 
 The remaining six obligations are products of organisational accountability 
(represented by solid arrows), five of which expand the authority of the UN and 
the accountability obligations of UNHCR. One organisational accountability 
obligation, “UNHCR’s actions, omissions, exercise of powers/function” creates a 
reverse accountability obligation for the UN to take responsibility for the actions 
of UNHCR.  
Four of UNHCR’s accountability obligations intersect and potentially conflict 
with each other. UNHCR’s legal accountability to “undertake additional activities 
determined by UNGA” and “follow UNGA/ECOSOC policy directives” intersect 
with its obligations to “defer to UNSG” and “follow UNSC resolutions” because 
21 
 
the latter require it to respond to authority within the UN in a way that is beyond 




The complexity of the inter-institutional relationship between UNHCR and the 
UN renders attempts to draw bright lines around its nature futile. Its legal scope is 
determined by UNHCR’s Statute and the implications of its position as a 
subsidiary organ of the UN, but the institutionally hierarchical nature of the 
relationship introduces less stable elements that expand, contract and occasionally 
undermine its legal or constitutional parameters. In addition, UNHCR’s 
institutional autonomy diminishes the practical authority that the UNGA holds as 
principal organ. Counterintuitive as it may seem, the relationship is typical of 
inter-institutional relationships in the global space in the sense that their 
commonality is diversity, and to understand those relationships is to appreciate 
and accept plurality. 
Plurality is nowhere more relevant than in regards to global accountability, an 
issue that occupies a significant portion of critical attention to global governance. 
If there are to be “solutions” to the accountability issues created by a context 
where the bounds on governance are weak and divergent, accountability must be 
understood in relation to that context and not according to traditional notions that 
are an uneasy fit for the global space. If accountability is understood in relation to 
relationships, not only are the unique accountability obligations of a global body 
revealed, the reasons why a body fails to be accountable becomes apparent. 
Without this fundamental insight, accountability mechanisms risk becoming 
aspirational tools that “say the right thing” yet remain ineffectual because of their 
failure to understand and respond to their subject. 
 
